MONEYBaRL: Exploiting pitcher decision-making using Reinforcement
  Learning by Sidhu, Gagan & Caffo, Brian
ar
X
iv
:1
40
7.
83
92
v1
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 31
 Ju
l 2
01
4
The Annals of Applied Statistics
2014, Vol. 8, No. 2, 926–955
DOI: 10.1214/13-AOAS712
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2014
MONEYBaRL: EXPLOITING PITCHER DECISION-MAKING
USING REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
By Gagan Sidhu∗,† and Brian Caffo‡
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This manuscript uses machine learning techniques to exploit base-
ball pitchers’ decision making, so-called “Baseball IQ,” by modeling
the at-bat information, pitch selection and counts, as a Markov De-
cision Process (MDP). Each state of the MDP models the pitcher’s
current pitch selection in a Markovian fashion, conditional on the
information immediately prior to making the current pitch. This in-
cludes the count prior to the previous pitch, his ensuing pitch selec-
tion, the batter’s ensuing action and the result of the pitch.
The necessary Markovian probabilities can be estimated by the rel-
evant observed conditional proportions in MLB pitch-by-pitch game
data. These probabilities could be pitcher-specific, using only the
data from one pitcher, or general, using the data from a collection of
pitchers.
Optimal batting strategies against these estimated conditional dis-
tributions of pitch selection can be ascertained by Value Iteration.
Optimal batting strategies against a pitcher-specific conditional dis-
tribution can be contrasted to those calculated from the general con-
ditional distributions associated with a collection of pitchers.
In this manuscript, a single season of MLB data is used to cal-
culate the conditional distributions to find optimal pitcher-specific
and general (against a collection of pitchers) batting strategies. These
strategies are subsequently evaluated by conditional distributions cal-
culated from a different season for the same pitchers. Thus, the bat-
ting strategies are conceptually tested via a collection of simulated
games, a “mock season,” governed by distributions not used to cre-
ate the strategies. (Simulation is not needed, as exact calculations
are available.)
Instances where the pitcher-specific batting strategy outperforms
the general batting strategy suggests that the pitcher is exploitable—
knowledge of the conditional distributions of their pitch-making de-
cision process in a different season yielded a strategy that worked
better in a new season than a general batting strategy built on a
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population of pitchers. A permutation-based test of exploitability of
the collection of pitchers is given and evaluated under two sets of
assumptions.
To show the practical utility of the approach, we introduce a
spatial component that classifies each pitcher’s pitch-types using a
batter-parameterized spatial trajectory for each pitch. We found that
heuristically labeled “nonelite” batters benefit from using the ex-
ploited pitchers’ pitcher-specific strategies, whereas (also heuristically
labeled) “elite” players do not.
1. Introduction.
“Good pitching will always stop good hitting and vice-versa.”
—Casey Stengel
Getting a hit off of a major league pitcher is one of the hardest tasks in all
of sports. Consider the fact that a batter in possession of detailed knowledge
of a pitcher’s processes for determining pitches to throw would have a large
advantage for exploiting that pitcher to get on base [Stallings, Bennett and
American Baseball Coaches Association (2003)]. Pitchers apparently reveal
an enormous amount of information regarding their behaviour through their
historical game data [Bickel (2009)]. However, making effective use of this
data is challenging.
This manuscript uses statistical and machine learning techniques to: (i)
represent specific pitcher and general pitching behaviour by Markov pro-
cesses whose transition probabilities are estimated, (ii) generate optimal
batting strategies against these processes, both in the general and pitcher-
specific sense, (iii) evaluate those strategies on data not used in their cre-
ation, (iv) investigate the implication of the strategies on pitcher exploitabil-
ity, and (v) establish the viability of the use of algorithmically/empirically-
derived batting strategies in real-world settings. These goals are accom-
plished by a detailed analysis of two seasons of US Major League Baseball
pitch-by-pitch data.
Parsimony assumptions are necessary to appropriately represent a pitcher’s
behaviour. For each pitcher, it is assumed that their pitch behaviour is
stochastic and governed by one-step Markovian assumptions on the pitch
count. Specifically, each of the twelve unique nonterminal states of the pitch
count are modeled as a Markov process. It is further assumed that the rel-
evant transition probabilities can be estimated by data of observed pitch
selections at the twelve unique pitch counts. It should be noted that the
transition could be estimated for a particular pitcher based on their his-
torical data, or historical data for a representative collection of pitchers to
investigate general pitching behaviour.
It is herein demonstrated that a pitcher’s decisions can be exploited by
a data-informed batting strategy that takes advantage of their mistakes at
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Fig. 1. A schematic of the Reinforcement Learning Value Iteration and Policy Evaluation
analysis of two seasons of MLB data.
each pitch count in the at-bat. To elaborate, if indeed a pitcher’s behaviour
is well modeled by a Markov process on the pitch count, a batter informed
of the relevant transition probabilities is presented with a Markov Decision
Process (MDP) to swing or stay at a given pitch count. Optimal batting
strategies for MDPs can be found by a Reinforcement Learning (RL) algo-
rithm. RL is a subset of artificial intelligence for finding (Value Iteration)
and evaluating (Policy Evaluation) optimal strategies in stochastic settings
governed by Markov processes. It has been used successfully in sports games-
manship, via the study of offensive play calling in American football [Patek
and Bertsekas (1996)]; see Section 5.3.3 for further discussion. The RL Value
Iteration algorithm applied to the pitcher-specific Markov transition proba-
bilities yields a pitcher-specific batting strategy. In the event that the Markov
transition probabilities were estimated from a representative collection of
pitchers, a general optimal batting strategy would result from RL Value
Iteration.
An important component of the development of optimal batting strategy
is their evaluation. To this end, RL Policy Evaluation is used to investigate
the performance of batting strategies on pitcher-specific and general Markov
transition probabilities estimated from data not used in the RL Value Itera-
tion algorithm to develop the strategies. A schematic of the analysis pipeline
is given in Figure 1.
In addition to evaluating the batting strategies on new data, comparison of
the performance of the pitcher-specific and general batting strategies yields
important information on the utility of an optimal, data-informed batting
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strategy against a specific pitcher. To this point, a pitcher has been exploited
if Policy Evaluation suggests that the pitcher-specific optimal batting strat-
egy against them is superior to the general optimal batting strategy, with
their difference or ratio estimating the degree of exploitability. The term “ex-
ploited” is used in the sense that an opposing batter would be well served
in carefully studying that pitcher’s historical data, rather than executing a
general strategy.
Given this framework, it is possible to investigate hypotheses on general
pitcher exploitability using permutation tests. However, the nature of the
tests requires assumptions on the direction of the alternative. Under the
assumption that all pitchers are not equally exploitable, the hypothesis that
pitchers can be exploited more than 50% of the time can be investigated.
This hypothesis was not rejected at a 5% error rate. Under the assumption
that all pitchers are equally exploitable, the hypothesis was rejected. It is
our opinion that the assumption of unequal exploitability is better suited
for baseball’s at-bat setting (see Section 2.4). Thus, this manuscript is the
first to provide statistical evidence in support of strategizing against specific
pitchers instead of a group of pitchers.
To highlight the utility of an optimal pitcher-specific batting strategy
for an exploitable pitcher, a data-driven validation was conceived. This
validation associates spatial trajectories with the pitch-type that was em-
ployed. The spatial component is a classifier that estimates the pitch-type
of a batter-parameterized spatial trajectory after training over the respec-
tive pitcher’s actual pitch trajectories. The estimated pitch-type selects the
batting action from the exploited pitcher’s pitcher-specific batting strategy
(Section 4.2; the schematic diagram outlining this process is provided in Fig-
ure 4). The simulation therefore uses the spatial and strategic component
to realistically simulate a batter’s performance when facing an exploited
pitcher. The batter’s actual and simulated statistics when facing the respec-
tive pitcher are then compared using typical baseball statistics.
It was found that heuristically-labeled “elite” batters’ simulated statis-
tics are worse than their actual statistics. However, it was also found that
the (also heuristically-labeled) “nonelite”2 batters’ simulated statistics were
greatly improved from their actual statistics. The simulation results suggest
that an exploited pitcher’s pitcher-specific strategies are useful for nonelite
batters.
The manuscript is laid out as follows: The section immediately follow-
ing this paragraph provides a very brief demonstration of Reinforcement
Learning algorithms to help stimulate understanding, Section 2 discusses the
2In our study, nonelite batters are excellent players, some having participated in the
MLB All-Star game.
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Fig. 2. GridWorld. The values in the right grid are determined using Policy Evaluation
with a policy that randomly selects one of the four actions at each state. Reprinted with
permission from Richard S. Sutton and Andrew G. Barto, Reinforcement Learning: An
Introduction, published by The MIT Press.
strategic component, which applies Reinforcement Learning algorithms to
Markov processes to compute and evaluate the respective batting strategies,
and Section 3 discusses the spatial component, which simulates a specific
batter’s performance using an exploited pitcher’s pitcher-specific batting
strategy. Section 4 provides the methodology used to produce the results
given in Section 5.
Reinforcement Learning tutorial. Reinforcement Learning focuses on the
problem of decision-making facing uncertainty, which are settings where the
decision-maker (agent) interacts with a new, or unfamiliar, environment. The
agent continually interacts with the environment by selecting actions, where
the environment then responds to these actions and presents new scenar-
ios to the agent [Sutton and Barto (1998)]. This environment also provides
rewards, which are numerical values that act as feedback for the action se-
lected by the agent in the environment. At time-unit t, the agent is given the
environment’s state st ∈ S , and selects action at ∈A(st), where A(st) is the
set of all possible actions that can be taken at state st. Selecting this action
increments the time-unit, giving the agent a reward of rt+1 and also causing
it to transition to state st+1. Reinforcement Learning methods focus on how
the agent changes its decision-making as a consequence of its experiment
in the respective environment. The agent’s goal is to use its knowledge of
the environment to maximize its reward over the long run. Specifying the
environment therefore defines an instance of the Reinforcement Learning
problem [Sutton and Barto (1998)] that can be studied further.
GridWorld (Figure 2) is a canonical example that illustrates how Rein-
forcement Learning algorithms can be applied to various settings. In this ex-
ample, there are four equiprobable actions that can be taken at each square
(state): left, right, up and down, where each action is selected at random
Any action taken at either square A or B yields a reward of +10 and +5,
respectively, and transports the user to square A′ or B′, respectively. For all
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other squares, a reward of 0 is given for actions that do not result in falling
off the grid, where the latter outcome results in a reward of −1.
The negative values in the lower parts of the grid demonstrate that the
expected reward of square A is below its immediate reward because after we
are transported to square A′, we are likely to fall off the grid. Conversely, the
expected reward of square B is higher than its immediate reward because
after we are transported to square B′, the possibility of running off the grid
is compensated for by the possibility of running into square A or B [Sutton
and Barto (1998)].
Employing Reinforcement Learning algorithms in various real-world set-
tings allows us to “balance” the immediate and future rewards afforded by
the outcomes at each state with their respective probabilities. This approach
enables the computation of a sequence of actions, or policy, that maximize
the immediate reward while considering the consequences of these actions.
2. Strategic component—Reinforcement Learning in baseball (RLIB).
2.1. Markov processes. Let {X(t)} be a Markov process with finite state
space S = {E1, . . . ,En} where the states represent pitch counts. We assume
stationary transition probabilities. That is, pEk→Ej = P (X
(t) =Ej |X
(t−1) =
Ek) for Ej ,Ek ∈ S is the same for all t [Feller (1968)]. Figure 3 displays
the Markov transition diagram omitting the absorbing states (hit, out and
walk).
We define optimal policies as a set of actions that maximize the expected
reward at every state in a Markov process. Conditioning on a batter’s action
at a state yields the probability distribution for the immediate and future
state. Since the at-bat always starts from the s0 = {0,0} state, the long-term
reward is defined as
J∗(s0) = max
pi={u0,...,uT }
E
{
T∑
t=0
g(st, u
t, st+1)
∣∣∣s0 = {0,0}, pi
}
,(1)
where:
• {st} is the sequence of states, or pitch counts, in the state space S vis-
ited by the batter for the respective at-bat. We define the set of termi-
nal states—that is, states that conclude the at-bat—as E = {O,S,D,T,
HR,W} ⊂ S , where O, S, D, T, HR, W are abbreviations for Out, Single,
Double, Triple, Home Run and Walk, respectively.
• pi = {u0, . . . , uT } is the best batting strategy that contains the batting
actions that maximize the expected reward of every state. Since the batter
can Swing or Stand at each state, it follows that u= Swing or u= Stand
for each nonterminal state.
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Fig. 3. Our view of an at-bat as a Markov process, where each oval denotes the state
{B,S} in the at-bat, where B and S are the number of balls and strikes, respectively,
arrows represent transitions, and t is the time unit that is the number of pitches thrown in
the respective at-bat. Asterisks denote that some states at the respective time-unit are still
valid transitions at higher time-units—that is, if a batter fouls off a pitch at t= 3 in the
{1,2} pitch count, they will still be in this state at t= 4. We omit the terminal (absorbing)
states for neatness.
• g(st, u
t, st+1) is the reward function whose output reflects the batter’s
preference of transitioning to state st+1 when selecting the best batting
action ut from state st. The reward function used in our study is
g(i, u, j) =


0, if j = {O} or j ∈ S ∩ Ec,
1, if j = {W} and u = Stand,
2, if j = {S} and u = Swing,
3, if j = {D} and u = Swing,
4, if j = {T} and u = Swing,
5, if j = {HR} and u = Swing
∀i /∈ E .
Further information on our formulation of the reward function can be
found in Section 5.3.1.
Equation (1) can be viewed as the maximized expected reward of state
{0,0} when following batting strategy pi, which is comprised of actions that
maximize the expected reward over all of the at-bats {st} given as input
[Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996)].
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the two-stage process of computing and evaluating the batting strat-
egy that is computed over the input training data. This strategy is then given as input,
along with the test data’s transition probability matrix PTest, to the Policy Evaluation
algorithm, which outputs the expected rewards for each state when following batting strat-
egy pi.
To find the batting actions that comprise the best batting strategy, we
find the batting action u that satisfies the optimal expected reward function
for state i [Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996)]:
J∗(i) = max
u∈U
[∑
j∈S
PTrainingu (i, j)(g(i, u, j) + J
∗(j))
]
∀i∈ S ∩ Ec,(2)
where PTrainingu (i, j) is an estimated probability of transitioning from state
i to j when selecting batting action u on the pitch-by-pitch data and J∗(i)
is the maximized expected reward of state i when selecting the action u that
achieves this maximum.
The Value Iteration algorithm, shown in Figure 5, solves for the batting
actions that satisfy equation (2). Intuitively, the algorithm keeps iterating
until the state’s reward function is close to its optimal reward function J∗,
where in the limit J∗ = limk→∞ J
k(i) ∀i ∈ S [Patek and Bertsekas (1996)].
The algorithm terminates upon satisfying the convergence criterion ∆ < ε,
where ε= 2.22 × 10−16 is the machine-epsilon predefined in the MATLAB
programming language; this epsilon ensures that the reward functions of
each state have approximately 15–16 digits of precision.
The Policy Evaluation algorithm, shown in Figure 6, uses the best batting
strategy pi on a different season of the respective pitcher’s pitch-by-pitch data
to calculate the expected reward of each state in the at-bat, given by
Jpi(i) =
∑
j∈S
PTestpi(i) (i, j)[g(i, pi(i), j) + J
pi(j)] ∀i ∈ S ∩ Ec,(3)
where Jpi(i) is the expected reward of state i when following the batting
strategy pi.
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Algorithm 2.1: Value Iteration(PTraining, g,S,U )
repeat
∆= 0
for each i ∈ S ∩ Ec
do
v← J(i)
J(i)←maxu
∑
j P
Training
u (i, j)[g(i, u, j) + J(j)]
∆←max(∆, |v− J(i)|)
until (∆< ε)
output (deterministic policy pi = {u0, . . . , un−1})
Fig. 5. The Value Iteration algorithm outputs the batting strategy pi that maximizes the
expectation at each state over the input data. Reprinted with permission from Richard S.
Sutton and Andrew G. Barto, Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction, published by The
MIT Press.
The transition probability matrices estimated via the training and test
data, represented by PTrainingu (i, j) and P
Test
u (i, j) in equations (2) and (3),
respectively, are the transition probabilities used by Value Iteration and
Policy Evaluation to compute and evaluate, respectively, the best batting
strategy, pi. The batting strategies are estimated against probability transi-
tions matrices computed from either a population of at-bats for one season
of a single pitcher’s data (pitcher-specific batting strategy) or one season of
a population of pitchers’ data (general batting strategy; see Section 4.1).
Algorithm 2.2: Policy Evaluation(PTest, g,S, pi)
repeat
∆= 0
for each i ∈ S ∩ Ec
do
v← J(i)
J(i)←
∑
j P
Test
pi(i) (i, j)[g(i, pi(i), j) + J(j)]
∆←max(∆, |v− J(i)|)
until (∆< ε)
output (Jpi)
Fig. 6. The Policy Evaluation algorithm, that calculates the expected rewards of every
state when using the batting strategy pi, given by Jpi ∈ Rn, on the input data. Reprinted
with permission from Richard S. Sutton and Andrew G. Barto, Reinforcement Learning:
An Introduction, published by The MIT Press.
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Policy Evaluation therefore allows a quantitative comparison of the pitcher-
specific and general batting strategies, pip and pig, on the same transition
probabilities representing the pitcher’s decision-making. Equation (3) shows
that the {0,0} state’s expected reward, denoted by J({0,0}), requires the
expected reward of every other state to be calculated first. It follows that
J({0,0}) is the expected reward of the entire at-bat. Thus, a pitcher is ex-
ploited if and only if Jpi
p
({0,0}) ≥ Jpi
g
({0,0}) [Sutton and Barto (1998)]
(see Section 2.4).
2.2. Models. The generality of the Markov process allows us to propose
models with various degrees of resolution, which depends on the number
of phenomena considered at each state. Below we outline two models of
information resolution as useful starting points.
2.2.1. Simple RLIB (SRLIB). Initially, we represented a pitcher’s de-
cisions by conditioning the pitch outcome (reflected by the future pitch
count) on the batter’s action at the previous pitch count. SRLIB therefore
has n= |SS ∩ E
c|= 12 nonterminal states
SS = {{0,0},{1,0},{2,0},{3,0},{0,1},{0,2}, {1,1},{1,2}, {2, 1},{2,2},
{3,1},{3,2},O,S,D,T,HR,W}.
2.2.2. Complex RLIB (CRLIB). CRLIB conditions the pitcher’s selected
pitch-type at the current pitch count on both the pitch-type and batting
actions at the previous pitch count.
We observed that the MLB GameDay system gave as many as 8 pitch-
types for one pitcher. We therefore generalized pitch-types to four categories:
fastball-type, curveball/changeup, sinking/sliding, and knuckleball/unknown
pitches. Assuming the set of pitch-types is T , our abstraction admits at most
four pitch-types for every pitcher—that is, |T | ≤ 4.
The inclusion of pitch-types results in state space SC = {SS ∩E
c}×T ∪E ,
where every nonterminal state incorporates the four pitch-types at each pitch
count, giving n= |{SS ∩ E
c} × T |= 48 nonterminal states,
SC = {{0,0},{1,0},{2,0},{3,0}, {0,1},{0,2},{1, 1},{1,2},{2, 1},{2,2},
{3,1},{3,2}}
× T ∪ E .
We represent the expected reward of the {0,0} state as the weighted
average over the expected rewards of the four pitch types associated with
the {0,0} state:
Jpi({0,0}) =
1
K
∑
ti∈T
KtiJ
pi({0,0} × ti),
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pip
SRLIB
=


{0,0}
{1,0}
{2,0}
{3,0}
{0,1}
{0,2}
{1,1}
{1,2}
{2,1}
{2,2}
{3,1}
{3,2}


=


0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0


pip
CRLIB
=


[ 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 ]⊤
[null]⊤
[ 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 ]⊤
[null]⊤


pig
SRLIB
=


{0,0}
{1,0}
{2,0}
{3,0}
{0,1}
{0,2}
{1,1}
{1,2}
{2,1}
{2,2}
{3,1}
{3,2}


=


0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0


pig
CRLIB
=


[ 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 ]⊤
[ 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 ]⊤
[ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 ]⊤
[null]⊤


Fig. 7. The pitcher-specific and general strategies, denoted by pip and pig, respectively,
computed on SRLIB and CRLIB for the 2009 season. CRLIB’s pitcher-specific batting
strategy for Roy Halladay had an empty second and fourth row because the MLB GameDay
system reported he did not throw any Sinking/sliding or Knuckleball/unknown type pitches
in the training data; a similar argument holds for the general batting strategy’s fourth row.
where Kti is the number of times pitch-type ti was thrown in the test data
and K is the total number of pitches in the test data.
2.3. Illustration of batting strategies. We now illustrate the batting strate-
gies that are produced by either SRLIB or CRLIB, respectively. As shown
in Figure 7, SRLIB and CRLIB have n-dimensional and (n×4)-dimensional
batting strategies, respectively. The action at each state is represented by a
binary value corresponding to Stand (0) and Swing (1).
For the strategies given in Figure 7, CRLIB/SRLIB’s pitcher-specific bat-
ting strategy exploited Roy Halladay on the 2010 test data. However, only
CRLIB exploits Halladay on the 2008 test data, presumably because it incor-
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porates information about his pitch selection, as it is believed that pitchers
often rely on their “best pitches” in specific pitch counts. For example: If
Halladay throws a fastball in the {2,2} pitch count, pipSRLIB selects the bat-
ting action u= Stand, whereas pipCRLIB selects u= Swing. In comparison to
the SRLIB model, we see that the inclusion of pitch type gives the CRLIB
model an enriched representation that can improve a batter’s opportunity
of reaching base.
2.4. Comparing an “intuitive” and general batting strategy. We show
that the general batting strategy is a more competitive baseline perfor-
mance measure than an intuitive batting strategy. This intuitive batting
strategy selects the action Swing at states {1,0},{2,0},{3,0},{2,1}, {3,1},
and Stand in states {0,0},{1,1},{1,2},{2,2},{3,2},{0,1}, {0,2}. In other
words, the intuitive batting strategy reflects the intuition that the batter
should only swing in a batter’s count;3 we show that these types of batting
strategies are inferior to statistically computed ones, such as the general
batting strategy.
After performing Policy Evaluation for both batting strategies, we ob-
served that the general batting strategy outperformed the intuitive batting
strategy 146 out of 150 times. The general batting strategy’s dominant per-
formance justifies its selection as the competitive baseline performance mea-
sure. Thus, we cannot assume that the pitcher-specific batting strategy will
perform better than, or even equal to, the general batting strategy when
performing Policy Evaluation on the respective pitcher’s test data.
Since each pitcher’s “best pitch(es)” can vary, it follows that the probabil-
ity distributions over future states from the current state will also vary, espe-
cially in states with a batter’s count. This is a consequence of the uniqueness
of each pitcher’s behaviour, which is reflected through their pitch selection at
each state in the at-bat, and thereby quantified in their respective transition
probabilities. This is personified by R. A. Dickey, as he only has one “best
pitch” (knuckleball) and throws other pitch types to make his behaviour less
predictable. Thus, when Dickey’s knuckleball is ineffective, an optimal policy
will recommend swinging at every nonknuckle pitch, as it is computed over
data that shows an improved outcome for the batter. In contrast, pitchers
that consistently throw more than one pitch type for strikes, such as Roy
Halladay, are more difficult to exploit via the pitcher-specific batting strat-
egy because the improved outcome in swinging at their “weaker” pitches is
marginal in comparison to pitchers that consistently throw fewer pitch types
for strikes. Given that the pitcher-specific and general batting strategies are
computed over different populations,4 and each at-bat contains information
3Please see Appendix for baseball terminology.
4Section 1, second last paragraph of page 2.
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about the respective pitcher’s behaviour, it follows that pitchers are not
equally susceptible to being exploited in an empirical setting.
If the pitcher-specific batting strategy performs equal to the general bat-
ting strategy, the competitiveness/dominance of the latter over intuitively-
constructed batting strategies ensures that the respective pitcher is still ex-
ploited because the intuitive batting strategy can be viewed as the standard
strategy that is employed in baseball. Let pii be the intuitive batting strat-
egy and assume that the pitcher-specific batting strategy performs equal to
the general batting strategy. By transitivity, Jpi
g
({0,0})≫ Jpi
i
({0,0}), and
Jpi
p
({0,0}) == Jpi
g
({0,0}), then Jpi
p
({0,0})≫ Jpi
i
({0,0}).
3. Spatial component. A spatial component is introduced to highlight
the utility of the exploited pitchers’ pitcher-specific batting strategies. The
spatial component associates the pitch-type based on the respective pitch’s
spatial trajectory, where this trajectory is parameterized specifically to the
batter being simulated. Thus, the spatial component predicts the pitch-type
for the batter-parameterized spatial trajectory given as input. This allows
us to simulate a batter’s performance when they use the exploited pitcher’s
pitcher-specific batting strategy against the respective pitcher (see Figure 9).
The spatial information for each pitch contains the three-dimensional ac-
celeration, velocity, starting and ending positions. This information is ob-
tained from the MLB GameDay system after it fits a quadratic polynomial
to 27 instantaneous images representing the pitch’s spatial trajectory. These
pictures are taken by cameras on opposite sides of the field. The MLB Game-
Day system therefore performs a quadratic fit to the trajectory data.
There are two problems with this fit. First, acceleration is assumed to
be constant, which is certainly not true. Second, there exists a near-perfect
correlation between variables obtained from the fit (such as velocity and the
end location of a pitch) and the independent variable (acceleration) used to
produce this fit. Figure 8 displays pitch locations along with predicted values
from regression with velocity or acceleration as predictors and location as
the response.
We see that the quadratic fit severely limits the use of each pitch’s spatial
trajectory. To address this limitation, we use the instantaneous positions of
every pitch trajectory to predict the pitch type.
3.1. Batter-parameterized pitch identification. We add α-scaled noise,
where α is a batter-specific parameter, to the original spatial trajectory of
each pitch to represent the respective batter’s believed trajectories. This is
achieved by first drawing independent, identically distributed noise from the
uniform distribution on the [−1,1] interval, which is then multiplied by the
parameter α, and finally added to the m evenly-spaced, three-dimensional,
instantaneous positions of the original (true) pitch trajectory.
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Fig. 8. The actual (square) and predicted (circle) locations for Tim Lincecum’s pitches
in the 2009 season, when performing OLS regression on break angle, initial velocity, and
break length features to predict the end location of each pitch. The rectangle in the center
of the plot represents the strike zone.
For the batter’s believed trajectories to accurately represent their pitch-
identification ability, α is defined as the number of strikeouts divided by the
number of plate appearances on the same year which the batting strategy
is computed on. Only considering strikeouts is justified by the fact that any
recorded out from putting the ball in play implies that a player identified the
ball accurately enough to achieve contact. In contrast, a batter that strikes
out either failed to identify the pitch as a strike or failed to establish contact
with the ball. Thus, adding α-scaled noise to original trajectory reproduces
a batter’s believed trajectory.
Fig. 9. Illustrating our spatial model, where α is parameterized according to the batter,
Ktraining denotes the number of pitches in the respective pitcher’s training data, and 300
represents the m = 100 three-dimensional points that describe the pitch trajectory. Here,
the Learner is a quadratic kernel Support Vector Machine (SVM).
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The training data’s true trajectories are given as input to a Support Vec-
tor Machine (SVM) [Vapnik (1998), Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman (2009)]
with a quadratic kernel, where each trajectory’s m= 100 three-dimensional
instantaneous positions form a single data point that has an associated pitch-
type. The SVM algorithm then computes a spatial classifier, which is com-
posed of coefficients β = [β0, . . . , β300], that best separates the training data’s
original trajectories according to pitch-type, usually with high accuracy.5
The spatial classifier allows pitch-type identification to be standardized
across batters, because the respective batter’s believed trajectory is only
identified as the correct pitch-type if it is similar to the original trajectory.
If the believed trajectory differs enough from the original trajectory, it will
be identified as the incorrect pitch-type; this is reflective of players with
higher α values that strike out often. We can therefore view the spatial
classifier as an oracle.
4. Methods and evaluation.
4.1. Strategic component. For our evaluation, we use 3 years of pitch-
by-pitch data for 25 elite6 pitchers, as shown in Table 1. We evaluated the
batting strategies performance for all six unique combinations of the train-
ing and test data, which gave a total of 25× 6 = 150 pitcher-specific batting
strategies. The data was obtained from MLB’s GameDay system, which pro-
vided three complete seasons of pitching data, containing the pitch outcome,
pitch-type, number of balls and strikes, and the batter’s actions. The techni-
cal details of the data collection and formatting process, which is necessary
before applying the Reinforcement Learning algorithms, are provided in the
supplement [Sidhu and Caffo (2014)].
Initially the general batting strategy was trained over all pitchers data for
the respective season, where it was observed that the general batting strat-
egy outperformed the pitcher-specific batting strategies on the respective
season by a significant margin. In other words, training the general batting
strategy over all of the pitchers’ annual data led to invalidation of the hy-
pothesis, regardless of whether pitchers were equally exploitable. Given that
the general batting strategy was trained over a much larger data set than the
pitcher-specific batting strategy, we sought a way to standardize the train-
ing data used to compute the general batting strategy, which is described in
the following paragraph. We acknowledge that in real-world settings, each
of the batting strategies should be trained over all available information,
as this information improves the resolution and precision of the probability
estimates exploited by the batting strategy.
5Training accuracies are provided in Table 2.
6We remind readers that our definition of elite is heuristically defined.
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Table 1
The annual statistics from the 2008, 2009 and 2010 seasons for the 25 pitchers used in our evaluation∗
2008 2009 2010
Player ERA WHIP W L IP ERA WHIP W L IP ERA WHIP W L IP
Roy Halladay 2.78 1.053 20 11 246.0 2.79 1.126 17 10 239.0 2.44 1.041 21 10 250.2
Cliff Lee 2.54 1.110 22 3 223.1 3.22 1.243 14 13 231.2 3.18 1.003 12 9 212.1
Cole Hamels 3.09 1.082 14 10 227.1 4.32 1.286 10 11 193.2 3.06 1.179 12 11 208.2
Jon Lester 3.21 1.274 16 6 210.1 3.41 1.230 15 8 203.1 3.25 1.202 19 9 208.0
Zack Greinke 3.47 1.275 13 10 202.1 2.16 1.073 16 8 229.1 4.17 1.245 10 14 220.0
Tim Lincecum 2.62 1.172 18 5 227.0 2.48 1.047 15 7 225.1 3.43 1.272 16 10 212.1
CC Sabathia 2.70 1.115 17 10 253.0 3.37 1.148 19 8 230.0 3.18 1.191 21 7 237.2
Johan Santana 2.53 1.148 16 7 234.1 3.13 1.212 13 9 166.2 2.98 1.170 11 9 199.0
Felix Hernandez 3.45 1.385 9 11 200.2 2.49 1.135 19 5 238.8 2.27 1.057 13 12 249.2
Chad Billingsley 3.14 1.336 16 10 200.2 4.03 1.319 12 11 196.1 3.57 1.278 12 11 191.2
Jered Weaver 4.33 1.285 11 10 176.2 3.75 1.242 16 8 211.0 3.01 1.074 13 12 224.1
Clayton Kershaw 4.26 1.495 5 5 107.2 2.79 1.229 8 8 171.0 2.91 1.179 13 10 204.1
Chris Carpenter 1.76 1.304 0 1 15.1 2.24 1.007 17 4 192.2 3.22 1.179 16 9 235.0
Matt Garza 3.70 1.240 11 9 184.2 3.95 1.261 8 12 203.0 3.91 1.251 15 10 204.2
Adam Wainwright 3.20 1.182 11 3 132.0 2.63 1.210 19 8 233.0 2.42 1.051 20 11 230.1
Ubaldo Jimenez 3.99 1.435 12 12 198.2 3.47 1.229 15 12 218.0 2.88 1.155 19 8 221.2
Matt Cain 3.76 1.364 8 14 217.2 2.89 1.181 14 8 217.2 3.14 1.084 13 11 223.1
Jonathan Sanchez 5.01 1.449 9 12 158.0 4.24 1.365 8 12 163.1 3.07 1.231 13 9 193.1
Roy Oswalt 3.54 1.179 17 10 208.2 4.12 1.241 8 6 181.1 2.76 1.025 13 13 211.2
Justin Verlander 4.84 1.403 11 17 201.0 3.45 1.175 19 9 240.0 3.37 1.163 18 9 224.1
Josh Johnson 3.61 1.351 7 1 87.1 3.23 1.158 15 5 209.0 2.30 1.105 11 6 183.2
John Danks 3.32 1.226 12 9 195.0 3.77 1.283 13 11 200.1 3.72 1.216 15 11 213.0
Edwin Jackson 4.42 1.505 14 11 183.1 3.62 1.262 13 9 214.0 4.47 1.395 10 12 209.1
Max Scherzer 3.05 1.232 0 4 56.0 4.12 1.344 9 11 170.1 3.50 1.247 12 11 195.2
Ted Lilly 4.09 1.226 17 9 204.2 3.10 1.056 12 9 177.0 3.62 1.079 10 12 193.2
∗Please see Appendix for baseball terminology.
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The size of the general batting strategy’s training data is approximately
equal to the average number of pitches thrown by the 25 pitchers in the
respective season, where every pitcher’s at-bats in this data set were ran-
domly sampled from all of their at-bats for the respective season. To ensure
the general batting strategy’s training data is representative of all pitchers’
data for the respective season, sampling terminates after adding an at-bat
for which the total number of pitches exceeds the proportion of pitches that
should be contributed by the pitcher. For example, Roy Halladay threw 3319
pitches in 2009, and all 25 pitchers threw a total of 80,879 pitches. Roy Hal-
laday therefore contributes ⌈0.04103× 3235.16⌉ = 133 pitches to the data
set. Repeating this process for all 25 pitchers 2009 data gives a data set
comprised of 3276 pitches.
To address the possibility that the aggregate data sample contains un-
representative at-bats for pitcher(s), which would misrepresent the perfor-
mance of the general batting strategy, the aggregate data sample was in-
dependently constructed 10 times, where the general batting strategy was
computed against each of the 10 (training) data samples. Thus, the gen-
eral batting strategy performance is the average over the 10 general batting
strategies’ expected rewards on the test data.
We evaluate the hypothesis under two different assumptions: all pitchers
are equally susceptible to being exploited, and all pitchers are not equally
susceptible to being exploited, where we believe the latter assumption is
more relevant to the real-world setting (see Section 2.4 for our explanation).
The null hypothesis is the same under either assumption, but the alternative
hypothesis H1 is slightly different:
H0: p=
1
2 . The pitcher-specific and general batting strategy are equally
likely to exploit the respective pitcher.
H1: p >
1
2 . The pitcher-specific batting strategy will perform:
strictly better than the general batting strategy more than 50% of the
time (assuming that pitchers are equally exploitable).
better than or equal to the general batting strategy more than 50% of
the time (assuming that pitchers are not equally exploitable).
For both hypotheses, the p-value calculation is given by
P (X >M) =
150∑
i=M+1
(
150
i
)
pi(1− p)150−i,
where M is the number of pitcher-specific batting strategies that exploit the
respective pitcher(s). Under the assumption that the pitchers are equally
exploitable, H0 could not be rejected; when assuming that pitchers are not
equally exploitable, H0 was rejected only for the CRLIB model (P (X >
M) = 3e–2, M = 87).
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When Policy Evaluation is performed on the pitcher-specific or general
batting strategy, the pitch-type thrown at the current pitch count is given
before selecting the batting action. It follows that Policy Evaluation implic-
itly assumes that the pitch-types are always identified correctly. This was
a desirable assumption because it only considers the strategic aspect of the
at-bat when calculating the expected rewards for the respective strategy.
It follows that the hypothesis evaluation is completely independent of the
batters used in the evaluation.
4.2. Simulating batting strategies with the spatial component. We define
the chance threshold as the proportion of the majority pitch-type thrown in
the training data, which serves as a baseline for a batter’s pitch-type identifi-
cation ability. We only simulate batters whose believed trajectories from the
test data are classified with an accuracy above the chance threshold. This
stipulation reflects our requirement that a batter must be able to identify
pitch-types better than guessing the majority pitch-type. Table 2 provides
the classification accuracies for the batters included in our simulation.
We use the spatial component to evaluate twenty prominent batters.
Among these batters, ten are considered elite and ten are considered to be
nonelite. We simulate each batter’s performance against an exploited pitcher
when using the respective pitcher-specific batting strategy. For every at-bat
that is simulated, the spatial component first predicts the pitch-type using
the respective batter’s believed trajectory. Then, this predicted pitch-type
is used with the current state to select the appropriate action from the
pitcher-specific batting strategy; see Figure 10.
After identifying the pitch-type and selecting the batting action, the con-
ditional distribution over the future states in the at-bat becomes determined.
We assign the future states “bin” lengths that are equal to the probability of
transitioning to their respective states, where each bin is a disjoint subinter-
val on [0,1]. We then generate a random value from the uniform distribution
on the [0,1] interval and select the future state whose subinterval contains
this random value. To ensure that the performance of the batter versus
pitcher is representative of each state’s distribution over future states, every
at-bat is simulated 100 times.
5. Results.
5.1. Strategic component. The number of pitcher-specific batting strate-
gies that exploited the respective pitcher are given in Table 3. The raw
results for SRLIB/CRLIB are given in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
It is apparent that no relationship exists between the performance of the
pitcher-specific batting strategy and the train/test dataset pair that it was
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Table 2
Evaluating the pitch identification ability on the 2009 (test) data, after training the spatial classifier on 2010 data. The accuracy is the
number of correctly predicted pitch-types on the respective batter’s believed trajectories from the 2009 season, after only observing the
original trajectories from 2010. The chance threshold is provided to show “how much better” the batter is doing than blindly guessing
one class∗
Accuracy
Batter Pitcher α Training Test Chance threshold # of PA (in 2009)
Miguel Cabrera Zack Greinke 0.1466 2776/2903 (95.63%) 3135/3376 (92.86%) 2005/3376 (59.39%) 14
Joey Votto Roy Oswalt 0.1929 3050/3374 (90.4%) 1926/3151 (61.12%) 1787/3151 (56.71%) 12
Joe Mauer Justin Verlander 0.0908 3545/3633 (97.58%) 3664/3794 (96.57%) 2553/3794 (67.29%) 14
Ichiro Suzuki CC Sabathia 0.1175 3154/3736 (84.42%) 3089/3985 (71.86%) 2405/3095 (54.99%) 11
Jose Bautista Jon Lester 0.1698 3047/3263 (93.38%) 2486/3397 (73.18%) 2423/3397 (71.33%) 11
Derek Jeter Matt Garza 0.1434 3201/3331 (96.1%) 3125/3288 (95.04%) 2336/3288 (71.05%) 14
Prince Fielder Matt Cain 0.1933 3265/3782 (95.85%) 3019/3177 (95.03%) 1986/3177 (62.51%) 9
Matt Holliday Clayton Kershaw 0.1378 3291/3328 (98.89%) 2872/3062 (93.79%) 2163/3062 (70.64%) 8
Ryan Howard Tim Lincecum 0.2532 3633/3870 (93.88%) 3047/3338 (91.28%) 1874/3338 (56.14%) 7
Mark Teixeira Cliff Lee 0.1713 3292/3427 (96.06%) 3134/3965 (79.04%) 2542/3965 (64.11%) 14
Nick Markakis Jon Lester 0.1311 3047/3263 (93.38%) 2475/3397 (72.86%) 2423/3397 (71.33%) 13
Carlos Gonzalez Matt Cain 0.2123 3265/3782 (95.85%) 3008/3177 (94.68%) 1986/3177 (62.51%) 7
Evan Longoria Roy Halladay 0.1876 3712/3782 (98.15%) 3146/3319 (94.79%) 2445/3319 (73.67%) 23
Brandon Philips Chris Carpenter 0.1208 2884/3420 (84.33%) 1438/2623 (54.82%) 1227/2623 (46.78%) 11
Manny Ramirez Jonathan Sanchez 0.1879 3420/3529 (96.91%) 2391/2724 (87.78%) 1866/2724 (68.50%) 11
Adrian Gonzalez Matt Cain 0.1645 3265/3782 (95.85%) 3042/3177 (95.75%) 1986/3177 (62.51%) 7
Carl Crawford CC Sabathia 0.1569 3154/3736 (84.42%) 3061/3985 (76.81%) 2405/3985 (60.35%) 13
Troy Tulowitzki Clayton Kershaw 0.1475 3291/3328 (98.89%) 2883/3062 (94.15%) 2163/3062 (70.64%) 14
Matt Kemp Jonathan Sanchez 0.2545 3420/3529 (96.91%) 2394/2724 (87.89%) 1866/2724 (68.50%) 11
Alex Rodriguez Roy Halladay 0.1647 3712/3782 (98.15%) 3147/3319 (94.82%) 2445/3319 (73.67%) 18
∗Please see Appendix for baseball terminology.
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Fig. 10. Illustrating the simulation for a batter using an exploited pitcher’s pitcher-spe-
cific batting strategy. The spatial classifier’s predicted pitch-type is used to select the row
that contains the batting actions for the respective pitch-type, and the current pitch count
is used to select the batting action for this pitch-type.
computed and evaluated on. This shows that the exploited pitchers’ pitcher-
specific batting strategies do not rely on seasonal statistics from either the
training or test data. Instead, these batting strategies rely on the pitcher’s
decision-making, which is presumably reflected through the pitcher’s pitch
selection at each pitch count. It follows that these characteristics are not
reflected in the respective pitcher’s seasonal statistics.
The inclusion of pitch-types in the CRLIB model resulted in a larger
number of exploited pitchers than SRLIB. This suggests the degree to which
a pitcher’s pitch selection is influenced by the pitch count. We use the spatial
component to simulate the batter’s performance against an exploited pitcher
when using the pitcher-specific batting strategy, which illustrates utility of
these batting strategies in actual players’ decision-making.
Table 3
The number of exploited pitchers using the respective train/test data partitions
Year of computed batting strategy
Model 2008 2009 2010
2009 2010 2008 2010 2008 2009
SRLIB 11 10 5 12 11 14
CRLIB 12 15 11 16 16 16
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Table 4
Values obtained from SRLIB after training on one year of data and testing on another. Superscripts pip, pig denote the expected reward
from the {0,0} state when following the pitcher-specific or general batting strategy. The bolded pitcher-specific batting strategies are
batting strategies that exploit the respective pitcher on the respective training and test dataset pair
Training on 2008 data Training on 2009 data Training on 2010 data
2009 2010 2008 2010 2008 2009
Player Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Roy Halladay 0.655 0.604 0.546 0.491 0.659 0.569 0.569 0.766 0.699 0.560 0.638 0.707
Cliff Lee 0.692 0.706 0.566 0.622 0.680 0.622 0.558 0.499 0.678 0.664 0.707 0.571
Cole Hamels 0.716 0.768 0.814 0.795 0.731 0.700 0.807 0.764 0.724 0.719 0.700 0.680
Jon Lester 0.713 0.764 0.876 0.847 0.742 0.737 0.831 0.718 0.739 0.741 0.710 0.709
Zack Greinke 0.642 0.608 0.747 0.835 0.795 0.688 0.739 0.719 0.824 0.836 0.607 0.672
Tim Lincecum 0.649 0.694 0.822 0.785 0.717 0.694 0.778 0.723 0.686 0.589 0.653 0.565
CC Sabathia 0.810 0.718 0.802 0.698 0.657 0.550 0.792 0.821 0.593 0.550 0.825 0.836
Johan Santana 0.785 0.862 0.773 0.703 0.680 0.694 0.774 0.838 0.651 0.773 0.744 0.852
Felix Hernandez 0.721 0.784 0.823 0.786 0.777 0.765 0.815 0.786 0.717 0.662 0.760 0.613
Chad Billingsley 0.802 0.865 0.788 0.812 0.750 0.790 0.792 0.812 0.752 0.785 0.792 0.860
Jered Weaver 0.860 0.841 0.691 0.734 0.762 0.770 0.704 0.711 0.770 0.759 0.883 0.840
Clayton Kershaw 0.738 0.719 0.716 0.667 0.909 1.125 0.710 0.691 0.996 0.800 0.757 0.837
Chris Carpenter 0.751 0.640 0.691 0.732 0.757 0.692 0.753 0.791 0.667 0.944 0.809 0.914
Matt Garza 0.827 0.792 0.794 0.794 0.725 0.622 0.779 0.834 0.692 0.622 0.797 0.880
Adam Wainwright 0.689 0.690 0.692 0.648 0.609 0.578 0.694 0.738 0.554 0.636 0.707 0.705
Ubaldo Jimenez 0.735 0.709 0.767 0.771 0.867 0.850 0.751 0.741 0.881 0.968 0.741 0.755
Matt Cain 0.753 0.878 0.665 0.610 0.828 0.897 0.693 0.610 0.815 0.854 0.755 0.774
Jonathan Sanchez 0.894 0.842 0.850 0.805 0.794 0.672 0.842 1.096 0.791 0.672 0.968 1.165
Roy Oswalt 0.710 0.639 0.787 0.750 0.876 0.667 0.777 0.651 1.022 0.967 0.687 0.666
Justin Verlander 0.769 0.763 0.757 0.758 0.883 0.758 0.758 0.755 0.930 0.914 0.758 0.776
Josh Johnson 0.683 0.661 0.673 0.701 0.716 0.691 0.689 0.755 0.658 0.691 0.684 0.764
John Danks 0.813 0.845 0.807 0.820 0.772 0.692 0.812 0.868 0.758 0.855 0.819 0.877
Edwin Jackson 0.916 1.053 0.854 0.725 0.948 0.928 0.840 0.802 0.987 0.930 0.966 0.929
Max Scherzer 0.843 0.707 0.794 0.732 0.854 0.728 0.789 0.804 0.847 0.899 0.868 0.774
Ted Lilly 0.714 0.568 0.740 0.666 0.774 0.770 0.689 0.613 0.792 0.780 0.708 0.690
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Table 5
Values obtained from CRLIB after training on one year of data and testing on another. Superscripts pip, pig denote the expected reward
from the {0,0} state when following the pitcher-specific or general batting strategy. The bolded pitcher-specific batting strategies are
batting strategies that exploit the respective pitcher on the respective training and test dataset pair
Training on 2008 data Training on 2009 data Training on 2010 data
2009 2010 2008 2010 2008 2009
Player Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Jpi
g
Jpi
p
Roy Halladay 0.644 0.594 0.603 0.585 0.544 0.575 0.642 0.784 0.538 0.558 0.568 0.765
Cliff Lee 0.564 0.534 0.532 0.595 0.600 0.562 0.522 0.478 0.627 0.700 0.536 0.557
Cole Hamels 0.644 0.701 0.622 0.664 0.540 0.537 0.595 0.484 0.526 0.634 0.653 0.617
Jon Lester 0.625 0.587 0.651 0.720 0.547 0.527 0.600 0.531 0.556 0.588 0.570 0.610
Zack Greinke 0.526 0.465 0.630 0.668 0.632 0.643 0.636 0.637 0.658 0.762 0.499 0.559
Tim Lincecum 0.531 0.555 0.657 0.497 0.590 0.650 0.565 0.580 0.578 0.583 0.543 0.545
CC Sabathia 0.602 0.543 0.604 0.604 0.514 0.657 0.546 0.659 0.458 0.581 0.588 0.615
Johan Santana 0.569 0.591 0.510 0.533 0.538 0.650 0.526 0.533 0.482 0.575 0.519 0.604
Felix Hernandez 0.580 0.607 0.523 0.564 0.602 0.551 0.529 0.565 0.526 0.504 0.577 0.556
Chad Billingsley 0.581 0.597 0.608 0.576 0.565 0.573 0.598 0.626 0.513 0.490 0.532 0.463
Jered Weaver 0.612 0.590 0.516 0.555 0.554 0.575 0.497 0.634 0.573 0.546 0.638 0.666
Clayton Kershaw 0.452 0.318 0.527 0.477 0.733 0.435 0.506 0.536 0.812 0.506 0.390 0.543
Chris Carpenter 0.542 0.508 0.638 0.506 0.459 0.000 0.686 0.882 0.288 0.269 0.597 0.640
Matt Garza 0.641 0.639 0.611 0.647 0.539 0.500 0.663 0.670 0.574 0.589 0.597 0.631
Adam Wainwright 0.608 0.590 0.595 0.527 0.620 0.785 0.589 0.588 0.464 0.504 0.601 0.546
Ubaldo Jimenez 0.547 0.636 0.529 0.565 0.597 0.690 0.497 0.632 0.604 0.560 0.594 0.597
Matt Cain 0.586 0.658 0.478 0.521 0.600 0.593 0.552 0.463 0.491 0.554 0.575 0.597
Jonathan Sanchez 0.730 0.730 0.585 0.543 0.590 0.478 0.558 0.773 0.593 0.447 0.729 0.861
Roy Oswalt 0.621 0.534 0.498 0.510 0.564 0.453 0.471 0.473 0.598 0.646 0.588 0.542
Justin Verlander 0.601 0.493 0.524 0.480 0.597 0.502 0.518 0.541 0.619 0.597 0.547 0.546
Josh Johnson 0.519 0.631 0.472 0.520 0.667 0.762 0.505 0.519 0.582 0.594 0.554 0.544
John Danks 0.682 0.749 0.537 0.492 0.518 0.512 0.502 0.478 0.502 0.538 0.642 0.656
Edwin Jackson 0.659 0.886 0.657 0.635 0.712 0.785 0.617 0.575 0.708 0.758 0.750 0.692
Max Scherzer 0.667 0.585 0.533 0.634 0.415 0.326 0.536 0.516 0.401 0.537 0.690 0.710
Ted Lilly 0.547 0.614 0.624 0.636 0.592 0.516 0.589 0.522 0.576 0.507 0.497 0.429
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Table 6
The actual statistics of the elite batters when facing the respective pitcher in the 2009
season∗
Batter Pitcher PA AB H BB SO AVG OBP SLG
Miguel Cabrera Zack Greinke 14 14 2 0 5 0.143 0.143 0.286
Joey Votto Roy Oswalt 12 12 4 0 2 0.333 0.333 0.500
Joe Mauer Justin Verlander 14 12 4 2 3 0.333 0.429 0.917
Ichiro Suzuki CC Sabathia 12 10 4 2 3 0.400 0.500 0.600
Jose Bautista Jon Lester 11 8 1 3 2 0.125 0.364 0.125
Adrian Gonzalez Matt Cain 7 7 6 0 1 0.857 0.857 1.714
Carl Crawford CC Sabathia 13 13 4 0 4 0.308 0.308 0.538
Matt Holliday Clayton Kershaw 8 5 2 3 2 0.400 0.625 1.025
Manny Ramirez Jonathan Sanchez 11 9 5 2 1 0.556 0.636 1.111
Alex Rodriguez Roy Halladay 18 17 6 1 2 0.353 0.389 0.471
∗Please see Appendix for baseball terminology.
5.2. Simulating batting strategies with the spatial component. We chose
Miguel Cabrera, Joey Votto, Joe Mauer, Ichiro Suzuki, Jose Bautista, Adrian
Gonzalez, Carl Crawford, Matt Holliday, Manny Ramirez and Alex Ro-
driguez as our elite batters, and Derek Jeter, Ryan Howard, Mark Teix-
eira, Nick Markakis, Brandon Philips, Carlos Gonzalez, Prince Fielder, Matt
Kemp, Evan Longoria and Troy Tulowitzki as our nonelite batters.
We used CRLIB’s strategies from the 2010/2009 train/test dataset pair,
where each batter’s α is calculated from the 2010 season, which is used to
construct the respective batter’s believed trajectories on the 2009 data (for
the respective pitcher). The actual and simulated statistics accrued by the
elite batters are provided in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.
When comparing the elite batters’ simulated statistics to their actual
statistics on the 2009 test data’s at-bats, the simulated statistics do not
show an appreciable performance improvement in comparison to the ac-
tual statistics. We evaluated the performance of the ten nonelite batters
to preclude the possibility that an exploited pitcher’s pitcher-specific bat-
ting strategy is detrimental to an elite hitter’s ability to get on base. These
nonelite batters are of course exceptional hitters, but are not considered as
elite at other aspects of the game. If following an exploited pitcher’s pitcher-
specific batting strategy is detrimental to elite hitters, then nonelite hitters
may still benefit.
Comparing the nonelite batters’ actual statistics to their simulated statis-
tics, shown in Tables 8 and 9, respectively, the simulated statistics are
superior to the actual statistics for all of the batters. This suggests that
the exploited pitchers’ pitcher-specific batting strategies are beneficial for
nonelite players. Considering that Joe Mauer, Ichiro Suzuki, Joey Votto,
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Table 7
Simulated performance of the elite batters on the 2009 season using the strategic and
spatial components, both of which are trained on 2010 data∗
Batter Pitcher AB H BB SO AVG OBP SLG
Miguel Cabrera Zack Greinke 911 295 0 93 0.324 0.324 0.538
Joey Votto Roy Oswalt 655 136 0 200 0.208 0.208 0.379
Joe Mauer Justin Verlander 723 169 0 127 0.234 0.234 0.390
Ichiro Suzuki CC Sabathia 775 237 0 138 0.306 0.306 0.452
Jose Bautista Jon Lester 701 198 0 181 0.282 0.282 0.413
Adrian Gonzalez Matt Cain 136 39 0 0 0.287 0.287 0.515
Carl Crawford CC Sabathia 978 280 0 231 0.286 0.286 0.457
Matt Holliday Clayton Kershaw 755 187 0 158 0.247 0.247 0.358
Manny Ramirez Jonathan Sanchez 635 321 0 93 0.506 0.506 0.624
Alex Rodriguez Roy Halladay 662 234 0 81 0.353 0.353 0.523
∗Please see Appendix for baseball terminology.
Manny Ramirez and Alex Rodriguez are generational talents, it is possi-
ble that elite batters make atypical decisions that only they can benefit
from.
5.3. Discussion. Before discussing the limiting factors on the experi-
ment, we briefly mention that the batter’s decision-making can be exploited
in a similar manner: Batter-specific behaviour could be modeled as a stochas-
tic process. Reinforcement Learning could then be used to obtain optimal
pitching strategies against both specific batters and the general population
of batters. This idea is relegated to future work.
Table 8
The actual statistics of the nonelite batters when facing the respective pitcher in the 2009
season∗
Batter Pitcher PA AB H BB SO AVG OBP SLG
Derek Jeter Matt Garza 14 14 3 0 2 0.214 0.214 0.357
Ryan Howard Tim Lincecum 7 7 2 0 4 0.286 0.286 0.429
Mark Teixeira Cliff Lee 14 13 2 0 3 0.154 0.214 0.231
Nick Markakis Jon Lester 13 13 1 0 6 0.077 0.077 0.077
Brandon Philips Chris Carpenter 11 10 1 3 2 0.100 0.182 0.282
Carlos Gonzalez Matt Cain 14 13 3 1 4 0.231 0.286 0.231
Troy Tulowitzki Clayton Kershaw 14 13 0 1 6 0.000 0.071 0.000
Matt Kemp Jonathan Sanchez 11 11 3 0 0 0.273 0.273 0.364
Evan Longoria Roy Halladay 23 17 4 4 4 0.235 0.348 0.235
Prince Fielder Matt Cain 9 7 1 1 1 0.143 0.222 0.286
∗Please see Appendix for baseball terminology.
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Table 9
Simulated performance of the nonelite batters on the 2009 season using the spatial and
strategic components, both of which are trained on 2010 data∗
Batter Pitcher AB H BB SO AVG OBP SLG
Derek Jeter Matt Garza 257 110 0 0 0.428 0.428 0.656
Ryan Howard Tim Lincecum 487 137 0 131 0.281 0.281 0.413
Mark Teixeira Cliff Lee 301 93 0 66 0.309 0.309 0.495
Nick Markakis Jon Lester 925 383 100 125 0.415 0.522 0.520
Brandon Philips Chris Carpenter 269 161 0 0 0.599 0.599 1.115
Carlos Gonzalez Matt Cain 283 86 0 59 0.304 0.304 0.435
Troy Tulowitzki Clayton Kershaw 1017 216 0 176 0.212 0.212 0.306
Matt Kemp Jonathan Sanchez 602 166 0 261 0.276 0.276 0.372
Evan Longoria Roy Halladay 1309 429 0 153 0.328 0.328 0.503
Prince Fielder Matt Cain 450 124 0 115 0.276 0.276 0.429
∗Please see Appendix for baseball terminology.
5.3.1. Potential limitations: Strategic component. The reward function
gives a higher reward for a single than a walk, reflecting the idea that a
batter should not be indifferent between a walk and a single. This is because
a single advances baserunners that are not on first base, whereas a walk
does not. We acknowledge that there are cases, such as when there are
no baserunners or one baserunner on first base, where a single should be
considered equivalent to a walk. However, it is desirable to compute a batting
strategy that maximizes a batter’s expectation of reaching base while also
trying to win the game; advancing runners is critical to winning in baseball.
In contrast, the slugging percentage (SLG) calculation can be interpreted as
a reward function that quantifies the batter’s preference of a single, double,
triple and home run as 1, 2, 3 and 4, while ignoring walks. Given that the
On-base Plus Slugging (OPS) metric is often used to measure a player’s
ability, but does not consider walks and hits as a function of the batting
action, it was felt that the reward function used in the study must address
this shortcoming by giving a reward of 1 for a walk; by doing so, all outcomes
are considered by the same reward function, where the lowest nonzero reward
is a walk, which addresses the shortcomings of OPS.
It is possible that performance can be improved by tuning the reward
function through Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) [Abbeel and Ng
(2004)], which can recover the optimal reward function. One caveat with
IRL, however, is that it requires a near-optimal policy to recover the op-
timal reward function, which suggests that a good reward function is first
required to develop a near-optimal policy. We therefore see an interdepen-
dence between the optimal policy and reward function, where addressing
this interdependence is a focal point of Reinforcement Learning research.
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Under the assumption that all pitchers are not equally exploitable, the
results show that strategizing against a specific pitcher is statistically better
than strategizing against a group of the pitchers more than 50% of the time;
assuming that pitchers are equally susceptible to being exploited by either
strategy, the hypothesis was rejected. However, we argue the statistically
significant result under the assumption of unequal susceptibility is stronger
because each pitcher has unique behaviour that is reflected in the transition
probabilities in each state of the at-bat (see Section 2.4 for further informa-
tion). Given that only two fewer pitchers are exploited under the assumption
that pitchers are equally susceptible to being exploited, which resulted in
rejection of our hypothesis, it is possible that evaluating the hypothesis over
a larger number of pitchers would result in a nonrejection under both as-
sumptions with the CRLIB model.
Important parts of the data provided by MLB’s GameDay system were
incomplete. There were cases where the at-bat’s pitch sequence consisted
of one (or more) pitches that did not have a pitch-type. For the 610,130
at-bats in the database, there were 32,632 pitches concluded for the at-bat
without providing the pitch-type. This was detrimental to CRLIB because
the last pitch of an at-bat determined the terminal state, and the pitch-type
determines the state being transitioned from. We therefore skipped over
pitches with missing pitch-types and simply incremented the pitch count by
observing whether the unlabeled pitch was a ball or strike. We also observed
that the 2008 season of data contained many more pitch-types than the 2009
and 2010 seasons for the same pitcher, which suggested that the GameDay
system data was maturing in its initial years; it’s feasible that future work
using newer data will report even better results than those in this article.
Using the four generalized pitch-types mentioned in Section 2.2.2 may
have a large impact on our results. However, there are 15 different pitch-types
in the GameDay system, and it is unreasonable to give CRLIB 15× 12 + 6
states due to issues that would arise with data sparsity, as we did not want
to use any sampling techniques.
A potential criticism of our batting strategy evaluations is that they are
evaluated over an entire season of data. We emphasize the fact that we are
not assuming that a pitcher does not adjust to the pitcher-specific batting
strategy. After initially using the pitcher-specific batting strategy in the
real world, we update the strategy using online learning algorithms, such as
State–Action–Reward–State–Action (SARSA) [Sutton and Barto (1998)].
Online learning algorithms update and recompute the pitcher-specific bat-
ting strategy using the pitch-by-pitch data after the pitcher adjusts to being
exploited by the initial batting strategy. We use a season of pitch-by-pitch
data to show the potential of our approach when the pitcher does not know
they are being exploited. Training and testing our model over two different
seasons of pitch-by-pitch data for the same pitcher shows that the pitcher-
specific batting strategy’s performance is not a consequence of luck.
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5.3.2. Potential limitations: Simulating batting strategies with spatial com-
ponent. Readers may argue that assuming the batter can hit the pitch if
it is identified correctly is not representative of the at-bat setting. However,
we are simulating the at-bat setting in a probabilistic manner, which means
that there is no guarantee that the batting action will yield a fortuitous out-
come. This is because batters reach base less than being out over an entire
season, and this is reflected by the large probability of the out state.
We do not consider predicting the end location of pitches because there
are two assumptions that we do not agree with: we are assuming that the
pitch-type and current state are related to a pitch’s end location, and we are
assuming that the pitch’s end location is related to the pitch-type, neither
of which are true. In the real world, batters rarely know where the pitch is
going. Instead, they rely on identifying the pitch-type prior to making the
choice of swinging or not. The limitations of the spatial component stem
from the absence of the raw spatial information for each pitch.
Another issue some may have with the spatial component is that, in con-
junction with an exploited pitcher’s pitcher-specific batting strategy, our
model fails to produce walks in all but one case. The lack of walks is a re-
sult of CRLIB’s pitcher-specific strategy suggesting that the batters swing
in pitch counts where there are three balls. Swinging at pitch counts with
three balls maximizes the batter’s expectation because pitchers do not want
to walk the batter. We mentioned that our model puts a higher priority on
advancing baserunners, and it is possible that this prioritization decreased
the OBP and AVG statistics. This decrease is explained by the fact that the
batters are swinging in states with large expected rewards, which can only
be reached with a base hit.
Additionally, the actual number of pitches thrown in the at-bat may be a
limitation on achieving walks in our simulation. For example, assume that
the actual 2009 data shows that the batter chose to swing in a certain
pitch count, and this swing led to them being out. Let us also assume that
exploited pitcher’s pitcher-specific batting strategy selects the batting action
“stand.” If this pitch is not thrown for a strike, the at-bat is incomplete
because there are no more pitches left. A similar limitation that arises is
when the batter identifies a pitch at the respective pitch count in the test
data, but the training data did not contain a case with this pitch count and
pitch-type. For example, the batter identifies the pitch as a fastball in a
{3,0} count, but the training data only contained curveballs being thrown
from the {3,0} count. In either of these situations, we skip the at-bat.7 These
examples illustrate how real-world data can be limiting on a simulation.
7We define “skipped” as the termination of the current simulation. This at-bat is only
simulated again if the 100 simulation limit has not been exceeded.
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5.3.3. Reinforcement Learning in football. Patek and Bertsekas (1996)
used Reinforcement Learning to simulate the offensive play calling for a
simplified version of American Football. They computed an optimal policy
for the offensive team by giving generated sample data (that was represen-
tative of typical play) as input to their model.
The optimal policy suggested running, passing and running plays when
the distance from line of scrimmage and “our” own goal line was between 1
and 65 yards, 66 yards and 94 yards, and 95 and 100 (touchdown) yards. The
optimal policy produced an expected reward of −0.9449 points when starting
from the twenty yard line. This meant that if the “our” team received the
ball at the twenty yard line every time, they would lose the game. It is
possible that the result could have produced a positive expected reward if
real-world data was used, but this data was not available at the time.
The appealing property of Reinforcement Learning is that it allows the
evaluation of arbitrary strategies given as input to the Policy Evaluation
algorithm. One strategy that was reflective of good play-calling in football
produced a slightly worse expected reward (−1.27 points) than the optimal
policy. Considering that this strategy was intuitive, manually constructed
and did not perform much worse than the optimal strategy, Reinforcement
Learning provides a platform for investigating the strategic aspects in sports.
After all, every team’s goal is to devise a strategy that maximizes the team’s
opportunity to win the game.
Reinforcement Learning’s applicability to baseball is tantalizing because
team performance depends on individual performance. The distinguishing
aspect of Reinforcement Learning in baseball (from football) is the scope
of the strategy: in football, a policy reflective of “good” play-calling does
not change significantly with the opponent. In baseball, the batting strategy
changes significantly with the opponent, as the batting strategy is pitcher-
specific. Using an exploited pitcher’s pitcher-specific batting strategy against
the respective pitcher should increase the team’s opportunity of winning the
game, as it increases the batter’s expectation of reaching base.
6. Conclusion. This article shows how Reinforcement Learning algorithms
[Patek and Bertsekas (1996), Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996), Sutton and
Barto (1998)] can be applied to Markov Decision Processes [Lawler (2006)]
to statistically analyze baseball’s at-bat setting. With the wealth of infor-
mation provided at the pitch-by-pitch level, evaluating a player’s decision-
making ability is no longer unrealistic.
Earlier work alluded to the amount of information contained in real-world
baseball data being a limiting factor for analysis [Bukiet, Harold and Pala-
cios (1997) and Cover and Keilers (1977)]. Noting this, what is particularly
impressive about CRLIB’s statistically significant result, which is produced
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under the assumption that pitchers are not equally susceptible to being ex-
ploited (See Section 5.3.1), is that each pitcher-specific batting strategy was
computed using a few thousand samples. In many previous baseball arti-
cles, authors have used Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques to
produce a sufficient number of samples to test their model [Albert (1994),
Jensen, Shirley and Wyner (2009), Reich et al. (2006)]. Currently, this is the
only model that uses only the real-world pitch-by-pitch data to produce a
result that is both intuitive and supported with algorithmic statistics.
Baseball has a rich history of elite batters making decisions that nonelite
batters cannot. This is exemplified by Vladimir Guerrero, a future first-
ballot hall of fame “bad-ball hitter,” swinging at a pitch that bounced off
the dirt for a base hit during an MLB game. It is therefore possible that elite
players do not benefit from an exploited pitcher’s pitcher-specific batting
strategy because they make instinctual decisions. Given that the nonelite
batters’ simulated statistics are superior to their actual statistics, using the
exploited pitchers’ pitcher-specific batting strategies would be incredibly
useful in a real MLB game. We feel that modeling the at-bat setting as a
Markov Decision Process to statistically analyze baseball players’ decision-
making will change talent evaluation at the professional level.
APPENDIX: BASEBALL DEFINITIONS
A Plate Appearance (PA) is when the batter has completed their turn
batting.
An at-bat (AB) is when a player takes their turn to bat against the
opposition’s pitcher. Unlike Plate Appearances, at-bats do not include
sacrifice flies, walks, being hit by a pitch or interference by a catcher.
A Hit (H ) is when a player reaches base by putting the ball into play.
A Walk (BB) is when a player reaches base on four balls thrown by the
pitcher.
The [pitch] count is the current “state” of the at-bat. This is quantified
by the number of balls and strikes, denoted by B and S, respectively,
thrown by the pitcher.
This is numerically represented as B–S, where 0 ≤ B ≤ 4, 0 ≤ S ≤ 3
and B,S ∈ Z+, where Z+ is the set of positive integers. Note that an
at-bat has ended if any one of the conditions is true:
• (B = 4)∩ (S < 3) (referred to as a walk)
• (B < 4)∩ (S = 3) (a strikeout)
• (B < 4) ∩ (S < 3) and the batter hit the ball inside the field of play.
This results in two disjoint outcomes for the batter: out or hit. There
is a special other case we mention below.
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A Foul is when a player hits the ball outside the field of play. If S < 2,
then the foul is counted as a strike. When S = 2 and the next pitch results
in a foul, then S = 2. That is, if a ball is hit for a foul with two strikes,
the count remains at two strikes. However, if a foul ball is caught by an
opposing player before it hits the ground, the batter is out regardless of
the count.
A Batter’s count is defined as a pitch count that favors the batter—that
is, the number of balls are greater than the number of strikes (exception
of the 3–2 count, which is referred to as a full count).
A Baserunner is a player who is on base during his team’s at-bat.
A Runner in Scoring Position (RISP) is a baserunner who is on second or
third base. This is because when an at-bat results in more than a double,
the baserunner on second base can score.
Walks plus hits per inning pitched (WHIP) is a measurement of how many
baserunners a pitcher allows per inning. It is the sum of the total number
of walks and hits divided by the number of innings pitched.
Earned Run Average (ERA) is the average number of earned runs a
pitcher has given up for every nine innings pitched.
On Base Percentage (OBP) is a statistic which represents the number of
times a player reaches base either through a walk or hit when divided by
their total number of at-bats.
Slugging Percentage (SLG) is a measure of the hitter’s power. It assigns
rewards 1, 2, 3 and 4 for a single, double, triple and home run. SLG is a
weighted average of these outcomes.
On-base Plus Slugging (OPS) is the sum of the On-base Percentage and
Slugging Percentage—that is, OPS= OBP+ SLG.
Acknowledgments. The following acknowledgments are strictly on the
behalf of Gagan Sidhu: I would like to dedicate this work to a Statistical pi-
oneer, Dr. Leo Breiman (1928–2005), whose fiery and objective writing style
allowed the Statistical learning community to garner recognition. This work
would not have been considered statistics without Dr. Breiman’s Statistical
Science article that delineated algorithmic and classical statistical methods.
Big thanks to Dr. Michael Bowling (University of Alberta) for both super-
vising and mentoring this project in its infancy, Dr. Brian Caffo for selflessly
senior-authoring this paper, and Dr. Paddock, the Associate editor and re-
viewers for providing helpful comments. Last, thanks to Lauren Styles for
assisting in marginalizing my posterior distribution.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplement to “MONEYBaRL: Exploiting pitcher decision-making using
Reinforcement Learning” (DOI: 10.1214/13-AOAS712SUPP; .pdf). A high-
level overview of the technical details of the implementation used in this
article.
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